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Abstract—A new model of multi-party secret key agreement
is proposed, in which one terminal called the communicator can
transmit public messages to other terminals before all terminals
agree on a secret key. A single-letter characterization of the
achievable region is derived in the stationary memoryless case.
The new model generalizes some other (old and new) models of
key agreement. In particular, key generation with an omniscient
helper is the special case where the communicator knows all
sources, for which we derive a zero-rate one-shot converse for
the secret key per bit of communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
A random number known only to several geographically
distributed terminals is a resource that can be used for crypto-
graphic purposes such as secure communications. Remarkably,
the terminals can usually distill such a shared random number,
or secret key, by communicating information about certain
correlated random processes they observe individually, even
though the communication is wiretapped by some eavesdrop-
per. The fundamental limits on the maximal secret key rate
can be studied using information theoretic tools [1][2][3].
In this paper we propose a new protocol of multi-
party secret key agreement, called secret key generation
with one communicator, as shown in Figure 1. Terminals1
Z,X1, . . . ,Xm observe general sources Z,X1, . . . , Xm, re-
spectively. The communicator Z is allowed to send public
messages W1, . . . ,Wm to X1, . . . ,Xm, before all the m + 1
terminals agree on an integer K (the key). We assume that for
each l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there is an eavesdropper wiretapping the
communication link from the communicator to Xl. Indepen-
dence of K and Wl for each l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ensures security.
We derive a single-letter characterization of the achievable
public communication rates and the key rate in the stationary
memoryless case, which is a special case of the above formula-
tion where we identify Z,X1, . . . , Xm with the corresponding
block symbols.
Of course, other related protocols of key generation have
been studied in the literature. The canonical one-way protocol
(Model S with forward communication in [2]) is a special case
of the secret key generation with one communicator protocol
where m = 1, in which case a key rate
R < I(U;X1) (1)
1Following the convention in [2], we denote the terminals by the alphabets
of the sources they observe.
X1 X2 . . . Xm
Communicator (Z)
K1 K2 Km
K
W1 W2 Wm
Figure 1: Key generation with one communicator
is achievable with a communication rate
R1 > I(U;Z)− I(U;X1) (2)
where QZX1 is the per-letter distribution of the stationary
memoryless source and U− Z− X1. However the m = 1
case does not assume the full complexity and difficulty of
the general case, as we shall see later in terms of the single
letter region and the coding scheme.
If no communication constraints are imposed, then the
maximal key rate is (c.f. [4]):
min
1≤l≤m
I(Z;Xl). (3)
While random binning Zn shows the achievability of (3), it
cannot be used for the rate constraint case, where the receivers
do not need to be able the construct Zn; indeed a main
difficulty with the rate constraint is to decide what common
message should the terminals be able to agree on.
Finally if the terminals only need to construct a com-
mon random number without any secrecy guarantee (the CR
generation problem), then the rate region is also known [5,
Theorem 4.2] (see also [6]): a CR rate of
R < I(U;Z) (4)
is achievable if
Rl > I(U;Z)− I(U;Xl), ∀l = 1, . . . ,m (5)
where U− Z− Xm, which can be shown using an extension
of source coding with side information [7]. In contrast, the key
generation problem in this paper requires much more involved
achievability construction and analysis. Specifically, we use
superposition coding in a novel way in order to convey the
information of the key securely to the receivers. Whereas in
the common usage of superposition coding the lower layer
codeword is decoded before the upper layer [8], in our con-
struction the index of the upper layer codeword is transmitted
to the receiver to facilitate the decoding of the lower layer
codeword. Moreover, we use the recent achievability technique
of likelihood encoding [9] in order to simplify the security
analysis considerably.
Particularly interesting is the special case of Z = Xm,
which we call the omniscient helper problem. In this case,
a zero-rate one-shot converse on the secret key per bit
of communication can be derived using hypercontractivity2,
strengthening the best converse bound that can be obtained
from Fano’s inequality. This new converse, derived from first
principles, also underlines the intimate interplay between key
agreement and hypercontractivity.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND MAIN RESULTS
Let QZXm
1
be the joint distribution of sources
Z,X1, . . . , Xm. As in Figure 1, the Terminals
Z,X1, . . . ,Xm observe Z,X1, . . . , Xm, respectively,
and the communicator Z computes the integers
W1(Z), . . . ,Wm(Z) possibly stochastically and sends
them to X1, . . . ,Xm, respectively. Then, the m + 1 parties
calculate integers K(Z),K1(X1,W1), . . . ,Km(Xm,Wm)
possibly stochastically.
In the case of stationary memoryless sources and block
coding, we substitute Z ← Zn and Xl ← Xln for each
l, where n is the blocklength. The measures of reliable
communication and secrecy are defined as follows:
ǫn = max
1≤l≤m
P[K 6= Kl], (6)
νn = max
1≤l≤m
{log |K| −H(K|Wl)}. (7)
Definition 1. The (m + 1)-tuple (R,R1, . . . , Rm) is said to
be achievable if a sequence of key generation schemes can be
designed to fulfill the following conditions:
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |K| ≥ R; (8)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Wl| ≤ Rl, l = 1, . . . ,m; (9)
lim
n→∞
ǫn = 0; (10)
lim
n→∞
νn = 0. (11)
From the standard diagonalization argument [10], the
achievable region is closed. Our main result is the following:
2Indeed, the new model stems from the first author’s attempt to design
a key agreement protocol in which the secret key per unit cost has a clean
correspondence to hypercontractivity.
Theorem 2. The set of achievable rates is the closure of
⋃
QUSm|Z


(R,R1, . . . , Rm) : R ≤
min{I(U;Z), I(US1;X1), . . . , I(USm;Xm)}
Rl ≥ I(USl;Z|Xl), 1 ≤ l ≤ m

 .
(12)
Remark 3. The region in Theorem 2 is not decreased if we
restrict to the union over QU|Z
∏m
l=1QSl|UZ.
Remark 4. Previous results of Ahlswede-Csisza´r [2] and
Csisza´r-Narayan [4] shown in (1)-(3) are clearly special cases
of Theorem 2.
A. Special Case: Omniscient Helper
As alluded to in the Introduction, the problem reduces to
an interesting special case when the communicator knows
all other sources. In this situation the communicator can be
viewed as a helper, since the requirement that it can recover
the key is vacuous because of its omniscience; the rate region
in Theorem 2 can also be simplified as follows, since setting
Sl = Xl in (12) is optimal.
Theorem 5. In the special case of Z = Xm, the set of
achievable rates is the closure of
⋃
QU|Xm


(R,R1, . . . , Rm) :
R ≤ min{I(U;Xm), H(X1), . . . , H(Xm)};
Rl ≥ I(U;Xm)− I(U;Xl), 1 ≤ l ≤ m

 .
(13)
The region in (13) has some special features:
Remark 6. The region for a product source can be strictly
larger than the Minkowski sum of its factors. Indeed even with
unconstrained communication rates, the supremum key rate is
as in (3), where the minimum implies that a joint encoding
can asymptotically strictly outperform separate encoding of
the independent components.
Remark 7. The key rate can be positive even if Xm has
independent coordinates. For example, when m = 2 and
X1 ⊥ X2 are equiprobable binary random variables, a key
rate of R = 1 is achievable if the helper sends X1n⊕X2n to
X2 and, thus, the terminals agree on X1n.
Remark 8. Comparing the CR generation region (4),(5) and
the key generation region (13), we see that in the omniscient
helper problem the secrecy constraint does not increase the re-
quired communication rates as long as R ≤ min1≤l≤mH(Xl).
In particular, this is unconditionally true for continuous
sources with infinite entropy. But even when the rate regions
coincide, the underlying achievability constructions are dif-
ferent; indeed the coding schemes for CR generation in ([5,
Theorem 4.2] and [6]) do not provide security. The reason why
secrecy can be gained with no extra cost for small R is that
the helper shares sufficient secure randomness (the sources)
with the other terminals to protect its messages.
III. ONE-SHOT ACHIEVABILITY VIA LIKELIHOOD
ENCODER
We outline the derivation of a one-shot achievability bound
using the recent proof technique of likelihood encoding
[11][9]. This method adapts to general non-discrete, non-
i.i.d. sources and simplifies the analysis of the secrecy con-
straint. Some standard notations in one-shot information the-
ory, which may be found in reference [12], will be used in
this section.
Theorem 9. Suppose the sources have joint distribution
QZXm . Fix an arbitrary QU|Z , QSlU|Z , 1 ≤ l ≤ m, integers
I0, . . . , Im and J1 . . . , Jm. Then there exists a key generation
scheme with |K| = I0, |Wl| =
∏l
i=1 IiJl which guarantees
that
P[K 6= Kl] ≤ 2m(ǫ+ T + Tl), (14)
log |K| −H(K|Wl)
≤ inf
0<δ<(IJl)
3
2 exp(−1)
{
4m(2T + Tl + 2δ) log
(IJl)
3
2
δ
}
(15)
for each 1 ≤ l ≤ m, where we have defined
I :=
m∏
l=0
Il, (16)
T := inf
γ∈R
{
P[ıU ;Z(U ;Z) > γ] +
exp(γ2 )
2
√
I
}
, (17)
Tl := inf
γ∈R
{
P[ıSl;Z|U (Sl;Z|U) > γ] +
exp(γ2 )
2
√
Jl
}
, (18)
ǫ := max
1≤l≤m
inf
γ∈R
{P[ıUSl;Xl(USl;Xl) ≤ log(I0 − 1) + γ]
+ exp(−γ)}. (19)
Proof Sketch:
• Codebook construction: for each l = 1, . . . ,m define the
set
Il := {1, . . . , Il}. (20)
Construct a codebook u(i0, i1, . . . , im), il ∈ Il, 0 ≤ l ≤
m, where each codeword is generated i.i.d. according to
QU . Let I := I0 × I1 × · · · × Im and I = |I|. For each
i ∈ I and 1 ≤ l ≤ m, independently generate a codebook
[sl(i, j)]j∈Jl (21)
where each codeword is generated i.i.d. according to
QSl|U=u(i).
• Encoding: define µV as the equiprobable distribution on
I, and
PˆZ|V=i := QZ|U=u(i), ∀i; (22)
PˆZV := PˆZ|V µV . (23)
Moreover for each l, let µW˜l be the equiprobable distri-
bution on Jl, and define
P
(l)
Z|W˜l=jV=i
:= QZ|Sl=sl(i,j)U=u(i), ∀i, j; (24)
P
(l)
ZW˜lV
:= P
(l)
Z|W˜lV
µW˜lµV . (25)
Then the encoder is a stochastic map
πV W˜m|Z := PˆV |Z
m∏
l=1
P
(l)
W˜l|V Z
(26)
that maps the observation z ∈ Z to v ∈ I and w˜m ∈ Jm.
In other words, we first find v using a likelihood encoder
with the likelihood function PˆZ=z|V and then find w˜l
using a likelihood encoder with the likelihood function
P
(l)
Z=z|W˜lV=v
. Suppose v = (v0, v1, . . . , vm) where vl ∈
Il, 0 ≤ l ≤ m. We identify k = v0 and wl = (w˜l, vl1) as
the key for the communicator and the public messages.
Note that the second components of wl have a nested
(aligned) structure, which is important for maximizing
the key rate.
• Error analysis: The main idea is to use the soft covering
lemma (c.f. [11, Theorem VII.1] or [13]) iteratively
to show that the true distribution πW˜lV Z is close to
Pˆ
(l)
W˜lV Z
in total variation (expected over the codebook).
By construction W˜l and V are independent under Pˆ (l),
implying that the individual message and the key are also
nearly independent under π. Moreover, the decoding error
probability of the receivers under Pˆ (l) can be bounded
directly by Shannon’s achievability bound [14].
Theorem 9 immediately implies the achievability part
of the region (12) in the i.i.d. case: assume without loss
of generality that the sources are ordered in such a way
that I(USl;Xl) is non-increasing in l. We then identify
(Sm, U,X1, X2, . . . , Xm, Z) in Theorem 9 as the block-
coding counterpart (Smn, Un, X1n, . . . , Xmn, Zn) and let δ
be exponentially converging to zero as n→∞, and
Jl := exp(n(I(Sl;Xl|U) + β))), l = 1, . . . ,m; (27)
I0 := exp(n(min{I(U;Z), I(USm;Xm)} − β)); (28)
Il := exp(n(min{I(U;Z), I(USl−1;Xl−1)}
−min{I(U;Z), I(USl;Xl)})), l = 2, . . . ,m; (29)
I1 := exp(n(I(U;Z)−min{I(U;Z), I(US1;X1)})) (30)
to show the achievability of rates
R := min{I(U;Z), I(USm;Xm)} − β; (31)
Rl := max{I(Sl;Z|U), I(USl;Z|Xl)}+ 3β, 1 ≤ l ≤ m
(32)
for β > 0 arbitrary. This establishes the achievability of
⋃
QUSm|Z


(R,R1, . . . , Rm) : R ≤
min{I(U;Z), I(US1;X1), . . . , I(USm;Xm)}
Rl ≥ max{I(Sl;Z|U), I(USl;Z|Xl)}, ∀l

 .
(33)
Then the achievability of (12) follows by noting that the
boundary of (33) can be achieved when Sl is chosen so that
the two terms in the max are equal.
IV. CONVERSE
Due to space, this section only presents the main idea for
the converse of Theorem 2.
A. Deterministic Encoder
We first consider the case where K and Wm are functions
of Zn (but Xl are allowed to calculate their keys randomly
from (Wl, Xln), for 1 ≤ l ≤ m). Given a key generation
scheme, denote by K,K1, . . . ,Km the keys produced by
Z,X1, . . .Xm and W1,W2, . . . ,Wm the messages sent to
X1, . . . ,Xm. Define
Ui := (K,Z
i−1); (34)
Sli := (Wl, Xl
i−1), 1 ≤ l ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (35)
and let N be equiprobable on {1, . . . , n} independent of all
previously defined random variables. We identify
U = UN , Sl = SlN , ∀l, (36)
which fulfills that
(U, S1, . . . , Sm)− Z− (X1, . . . ,Xm). (37)
The bounds in Theorem 2 can be verified using entropic
manipulations and Fano’s inequality.
B. Stochastic Encoders
The converse for stochastic encoders cannot be obtained by
simple modifications of the analysis in IV-A. Indeed, the bound
in (12) no longer holds for stochastic encoders if we stick to
the assignment of the auxiliary random variables in (34)-(36).
An alternative approach is to view a stochastic encoder as
a deterministic function of Zn and V , where V is a random
number satisfying (X1n, . . . , Xmn)−Zn−V , and then employ
the converse for deterministic encoders. We immediately see
that any achievable rates (R,R1, . . . , Rm) must satisfy
R ≤ min{I(U;ZV), I(US1;X1), . . . , I(USm;Xm)}; (38)
Rl ≥ max{I(Sl;ZV|U), I(USl;ZV|Xl)}, 1 ≤ l ≤ m (39)
for some PUSTV|Z. Then it is possible to show that the region
specified by (38)-(39) is equivalent to the region specified in
(12) upon optimization.
V. A ZERO-RATE ONE-SHOT CONVERSE
In this section we derive a novel one-shot bound, using
hypercontractivity, on the maximum ratio of the log alphabet
sizes of the key and the messages such that the key can be
successfully generated in the omniscient helper problem. Since
this ratio is supremized as the key rate and the communication
rates tend to zero, such a converse bound may also be called
a zero-rate converse. The bound is asymptotically tight in the
case of abundant correlated sources but limited communication
rates, and gives a strong converse as it shows that the total
variation between the true and the correct distributions tends
to the maximal value under appropriate rate conditions. On the
other hand, previous works have obtained one-shot converses
using smooth Renyi entropy [15] or the meta-converse idea
[16][17], for which the asymptotic tightness are achieved in
the other extreme of limited correlated sources but unlimited
communications.
An m-tuple of random variables (X1, . . . , Xm) is said to be
(p1, . . . , pm)-hypercontractive for pl ∈ [1,∞), l = 1, . . . ,m
if
E
[
m∏
l=1
fl(Xl)
]
≤
m∏
l=1
‖fl(Xl)‖pl (40)
for all bounded real-valued measurable functions fl defined on
Xl, l = 1, . . . ,m. In [18], Nair showed that (40) is equivalent
to the following inequality3
I(U ;Xm) ≥
m∑
l=1
1
pl
I(U ;Xl) (41)
being valid for all PU|Xm . Thus from Theorem 5 and (41),
key generation cannot be accomplished asymptotically if
R <
m∑
l=1
1
pl
(R−Rl); (42)
while if r1, . . . , rm satisfies the property that
1 ≥ ∑ml=1 1pl (1 − rl) for all (p1, . . . , pm) such that
(X1, . . . , Xm) is (p1, . . . , pm)-hypercontractive, then there
exists (R,R1, R2, . . . , Rm) achievable such that RlR = rl for
each l = 1, . . . ,m.
We prove a zero-rate one-shot converse for the omni-
scient helper problem. Consider the one-shot case. Suppose
the (possibly stochastic) encoder for the public messages is
specified by PWm|Xm and the (possibly stochastic) decoder
for the key is given by
∏m
l=1 PKl|XlWl . Let µKm be the
correct distribution under which K1 = K2 = · · · = Km is
equiprobably distributed on K. Clearly, a small total variation
|PKm − µKm | implies both uniformity of the key distribution
and a small probability of key disagreement.
Theorem 10. In the omniscient helper problem, if the source
Xm is (p1, . . . , pm)-hypercontractive,4 then
1
2
|PKm − µKm | ≥ 1− 1|K| −
[
|K|
m∏
l=1
( |Wl|
|K|
) 1
pl
] 1
∑
p
−1
l
(43)
Remark 11. Theorem 10 only concerns the performance of
CR generation, which will provide an obvious upper bound
on the performance of key generation. For the omniscient
helper problem, it turns out to be tight because the highest
key-communication ratio is achieved with small rates (by
convexity of the achievable region), in which regime the
3In [18] the equivalence is demonstrated for m = 2, but the method therein
can be easily extended to the m > 2 case.
4In the i.i.d. case this is equivalent to the per-letter source Xm being
(p1, . . . , pm)-hypercontractive by the tensorization property [18].
secrecy constraint does not require higher communication rates
(Remark 8).
Remark 12. Theorem 10 yields a stronger converse on the
achievable ratio of the the log alphabet sizes of the key and
the messages than Theorem 5, because:
• The converse from Theorem 5 is vacuous when the rates
are zero. In contrast, Theorem 10 is still applicable when
the log size of the key alphabet grows sub-linearly in the
blocklength. In fact, as long as
log |K| −
m∑
l=1
1
pl
(log |K| − log |Wl|)→ −∞ (44)
which is weaker than (42), Theorem 10 implies that
|PKm − µKm | converges to 2.
• Even if (42) holds, the converse of Theorem 5 relying
on Fano’s inequality does not guarantee that the error
probability in (6) tends to 1. Moreover Theorem 5 uses
relative entropy as the secrecy measure (7) (stronger than
total variation), amounting to a weaker converse.
Proof: For any k ∈ K,
P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
]
(45)
=
∫
Xm
∑
wm
m∏
l=1
PKl=k|XlWl=wlPWm|XmdPXm (46)
≤
∫
Xm
max
wm
m∏
l=1
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXm (47)
≤
∫
Xm
m∏
l=1
max
wl
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXm (48)
≤
m∏
l=1
[∫
Xl
(max
wl
PKl=k|XlWl=wl)
pldPXl
] 1
pl (49)
≤
m∏
l=1
[∫
Xl
max
wl
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXl
] 1
pl (50)
≤
m∏
l=1
[∑
wl
∫
Xl
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXl
] 1
pl
(51)
where
• (49) uses the definition of hypercontractivity;
• (50) uses pl > 1 and maxwl PKl=k|XlWl=wl ≤ 1.
Raising both sides of (51) to the power of 1∑m
i=1
p
−1
i
, we obtain
P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
] 1
∑
i p
−1
i
≤
m∏
l=1
[∑
wl
∫
Xl
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXl
] p−1l
∑
i p
−1
i (52)
But the function tm 7→∏ml=1 t
p
−1
l
∑
i p
−1
i
l is a concave function on
[0,∞)m, so by Jensen’s inequality,
1
|K|
|K|∑
k=1
m∏
l=1
[∑
wl
∫
Xl
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXl
] p−1l
∑
i p
−1
i (53)
≤
m∏
l=1

∑
wl
∫
Xl
1
|K|
|K|∑
k=1
PKl=k|XlWl=wldPXl


p
−1
l
∑
i p
−1
i
(54)
=
m∏
l=1
[∑
wl
∫
Xl
1
|K|dPXl
] p−1l
∑
i p
−1
i (55)
=
m∏
l=1
( |Wl|
|K|
) p−1l
∑
i p
−1
i (56)
Combining (52) and (56) we obtain
1
|K|
|K|∑
k=1
P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
] 1
∑
i p
−1
i ≤
m∏
l=1
( |Wl|
|K|
) p−1l
∑
i p
−1
i
.
(57)
Finally we invoke the following elementary bound:
1
2
|PKm − µKm |
=
|K|∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
]
− 1|K|
∣∣∣∣∣+ 1−
|K|∑
k=1
P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
]
(58)
≥ 1− 1|K| − |K|
1
∑
l p
−1
l
−1
|K|∑
k=1
P
[
m⋂
l=1
{Kl = k}
] 1
∑
l p
−1
l (59)
and the proof is finished by combining (57) and (58).
VI. DISCUSSION
It remains an enticing problem for future research to find out
whether the achievable region is changed if we further require
that the key has to be independent of all messages, instead of
each message individually (see (7)). Such a stronger secrecy
constraint is relevant when a powerful eavesdropper is able to
intercept the messages to all the receivers. Our achievability
proof does not guarantee this stronger level of secrecy, but for
some specific sources it is possible to use structured codes to
align different sub-codebooks so that the achievable rates do
not change. Furthermore, in the unlimited communication case
the key rate is not compromised by the stronger requirement
either; see (3). Generally, an inner bound can be obtained by
replacing Sl in (12) with Sl, the proof of which involves a
vertical structure of superposition codebooks for U , S1, ...,
Sm, in contrast to the parallel structure of S1, ..., Sm in the
achievability proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 10 also gives an asymptotically tight strong con-
verse bound for the canonical one-way protocol (Model S
with forward communication in [2]). By setting m = 2 and
R1 = 0, the resulting model immediately gives an upper-
bound on the performance of a CR generation model where X1
communicates to X2. This in turn bounds performance of one-
way key generation model because the public communication
can be used as part of the CR. In the end we can show that the
TV between PKW and the correct distribution µKW = µKµW
tends to 2 if log |K| − s∗(X1;X2)1−s∗(X1;X2) log |W| → ∞, where
s∗(X1;X2) is the strong data processing coefficient [18].
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